Strawson himself seems to have changed his mind about what one could hope to achieve by means of those arguments, initially thinking that they could provide a refutation of skepticism and hence a proof of realism45, but then coming to believe that their role was simply to draw conceptual connections within a pre-existent i. They are simply to be neglected except, perhaps, in so far as they supply a harmless amusement, a mild diversion to the intellect. They are to be neglected because they are idle; powerless against the force of nature, of our naturally implanted disposition to belief.
This does not mean that Reason has no part to play in relation to our beliefs concerning matters of fact and existence. As indeed it does to me. Are we convinced? Now I think we should happily grant that much. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning.
And not to try to go further back. So I take it that at least part of what Wittgenstein means in that quote is that the task of deciding where philosophy shall begin-and end-is really a difficult one. Philosophy, I would like to say, should be always provisional. Yet there are other, more specific reasons for that.
That reality would be unlivable. But skepticism about whether our happily substantial conceptual scheme really describes reality in itself is not a skepticism that would seem to impact directly on everyday life at all, and would therefore not be unlivable.
But what is precisely the alternative to accommodation, i. It means, first and foremost, to recognize-and, if one is to avoid tragedy, to accept-my real separateness from others-the fact, i. The suggestion is: I suffer a kind of blindness, but I avoid the issue by projecting this darkness upon the other.
The soul may be invisible to us the way something absolutely present may be invisible to us. CR In other words, we cannot but acknowledge that such outrageous acts and attitudes are as human as any other-if, i.
Actually, I think that repressing that knowledge is really a dangerous thing to do. Yet Strawson seems to be doing just that when he says, e. And does not that realization show that some instability, hence some doubt, hence the possibility of skepticism, are so to speak internal or intrinsic to our finite epistemic condition? Yet if our attitudes-both detached and non-detached- toward others are not grounded in anything beyond ourselves, then the burden and the responsibility for creating and maintaining inter-personal relationships, hence a community, is at least partially upon me, upon each of us And yet notice that, as I see this dispute, a skeptic or a solipsist would have a clear advantage against their dismissive opponents, in that the former would at least recognize that there is a real difficulty, and one that simply cannot be solved by acquiring more knowledge-since there is no reason to suppose that we know something that the skeptic or the solipsist ignore-let alone by simply adducing our ordinary beliefs, or natural facts about us, or by describing our conceptual scheme.
Descriptive metaphysics with human face: a methodological lesson 64 introduced and exemplified in that book. So that seems a good first step toward a better understanding of what is at stake when we describe the conditions of use of our concepts, or evaluate alternative ones. Yet I think we can do better. The argument of chapter 3 of Individuals is still one of the most lucid examinations of the criteria for personhood in twentieth-century analytic philosophy.
The paper underwent important changes and was published as a section of the book On Film Mulhall, The revised version of the passage quoted above is on p. Descriptive metaphysics with human face: a methodological lesson 66 The analysis above provides the elements for a more general methodological lesson. The first question to ask here is what exactly is the nature of that demand, and then whether it is legitimate as it stands.
I conclude with a general and still more speculative suggestion, which I do not claim to have established in any definitive way, and which I shall continue pursuing and illustrating in the next chapters. The suggestion is that we should always suspect that the supposedly 55 Perhaps Strawson would be willing to argue that the kind of simplified model we get as the outcome of work in descriptive metaphysics would be justified in an analogous way to that of scientific models, i.
Yet for the time being I shall only highlight that by claiming that philosophical problems are intellectualized expressions of existential difficulties I am not suggesting that they are in any way less important-rather the contrary.
Diamond attributes the phrase to John ike ibid. John Hyman and Stephen Mulhall, who read and commented a previous draft, and to Rogerio Passos Severo, who helped me with the translation of that draft to English.
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The Lonely Eye: Solipsism and the limits of sense in the Tractatus 68 2 The Lonely Eye: Solipsism and the limits of sense in the Tractatus In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important. Wittgenstein, Z § 2. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the first and actually the only philosophical book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. The first explicit reference to solipsism in that work occurs in a rather late context-namely, section 5.
Is it in the first numbered proposition? In the first line of the Preface? In the Motto from Kurnberger? After all, they can be asked in relation to any any philosophical? book; and yet, as we shall see, they are especially pressing when one is dealing with the Tractatus, since much of what one takes to be the results of this particular book will depend on how and where one decides to start reading it-as well as on how and where one takes the reading to end.
The last statement is admittedly opaque; in part, this is due to the difficulties I have to cope with in getting my own reading of the Tractatus started I mean, to start it anew, to recount it in this very text : on the one hand, I would like to say enough about how I think the book should be read in order to account for my strategy in what follows; on the other hand, too much information about this may cause the most important lesson of the whole enterprise 58 More on this point below see esp.
Prologue: on begining-and ending 69 to be lost-as when a film trailer gives away most of its plot, thus completely spoiling our experience. Moreover, these changes are not merely in details, but sometimes amount rather to something akin to Gestalt switches, whose alternating results are the impression that nothing makes sense anymore-that all the pieces of the puzzle are out of place-followed by the impression that everything is finally fitting together.
How can you be sure that some particular configuration of the pieces is not yet another illusion? In fact, one of the greatest difficulties generated in the process of reading the Tractatus as I think it should be read-one which I had to learn how to live with-is precisely the increasing level of philosophical self-consciousness it produces, with which comes an equally increasing suspicion about the results one gets-or takes oneself as getting.
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This, in turn, is the reason why it becomes so difficult to write about the Tractatus after finding your way through itafter all, how to combine the all but unavoidable self- subversiveness of the process-the awareness, acquired after each round, that the previous approach was in some important respect wrong-with the need to present a linear reconstruction of it?
The answer I came up with after some reflection was that I should present my own development, including its phases of Gestalt reorganization, its self- questioning and self-suspicious moments, with some detail, so that it could be taken by others as an example-to follow, or to avoid. The idea, then, is not to record every single step in my journey-after all, it is not a diary that I expect you to read; rather, I had to pick out some of the points where the most important changes occurred, in order to make that gradual and evolving process somehow discrete.
Some level of artificiality is implied by this choice, which, however ultimately unsatisfactory, seemed inevitable.
Prologue: on begining-and ending 70 2. And this, in turn, means that one is well advised at least provisionally to follow the path devised by Wittgenstein himself-i. The Preface-and, consequently, the Tractatus itself-opens with the following words: Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself had the thoughts expressed in it-or at least similar thoughts. Act one: reading the Tractatus 71 These words, it seems to be, give us a particular picture of the experience of reading the book they introduce-about the kind of attitude which is expected from its readers, and the aims it is designed to achieve.
For let us take its first sentence at face value how else should we take it? Is not the reason for reading books to learn new things? Furthermore, what could be the reason to write it, if not to convince at least some readers-particularly, those who did not already had those thoughts-of the rightness or truth of its theses?
Consistently enough, the second and third sentences just seem to testify that there is nothing to be learnt from this book-what else could we expect from reading and understanding thoughts we already had, except a kind of narcissistic? pleasure, i. Needless to say, this is not an auspicious beginning for a book. In fact, so inauspicious and puzzling it is, that it has almost without exception elicited from the readers an attitude of quick dismissal, as if it was obvious-against the parenthetical suggestion I made above- that we should not take those introductory sentences at face value.
This should remind us that, notwithstanding the attempts of an author to guide his readers through a well defined path, it is always our prerogative to accept or to reject the options at our disposal.
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Or was he rather willing to elicit just that kind of dismissive attitude from his readers? And, if the latter, what is the use of it? Of course such decision has a price, to the extent in which we are to take this reading seriously: it commits us to come back later, so as to make sure that the decision was sound.
Again, this is arguably a burden presented to any reading of any book whatsoever; nevertheless, books like the Tractatus-by which I mean, books written in such an ostensibly self-conscious manner-are peculiar, in that it is always an open possibility in such cases that this kind of initially dismissive attitude-which can in due course change into a more self-suspicious move-is just what they intend to elicit from their readers-or at least from some of them, i.
But then again, it is up to us at this point to give the author the benefit of doubt-since, arguably, we are just being presented with a thesis that the book as a whole is supposed to prove. They come back to us with a certain alienated majesty. If its thoughts are not yours, they will do you no good.
In their sublimity as my rejected-say repressed- thoughts, they represent my further, next, unattained but attainable, self. To think otherwise, to attribute the origin of my thoughts simply to the other, thoughts which are then, as it were, implanted in me-some would say caused-by let us say some Emerson, is idolatry.
The obvious question to be made at this point is how exactly can such a clarity be attained? Is Wittgenstein implying that those methods should radically change, or rather that philosophy is simply a hopeless confused enterprise, which should be just abandoned after we understand its true origins and fate? The following two paragraphs seem designed to answer at least some of the questions made above: Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather-not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of this limit thinkable i.
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense. Wittgenstein himself testifies 62 I owe this indication to Dr. Stephen Mulhall. Act one: reading the Tractatus 74 this by confessing, in the penultimate paragraph of the Preface, his own limitations concerning the expression of the thoughts which are contained in the rest of the book.
Here is the passage in which he makes such a confession: If this work has any value, it consists in two things: the first is that thoughts are expressed in it, and on this score the better the thoughts are expressed-the more the nail has been hit on the head-the greater will be its value. Simply because my powers are too slight for the accomplishment of the task.
be said clearly, but it does not need to be so, and, as a matter of fact, it is far from being so-hence the philosophical problems. This is not the first-and of course neither the last-time that a philosopher takes his own achievements in such a high account, so maybe that is not to be unexpected. These are again difficulties that we can decide to put aside, waiting to see if the reading of the book can help to make things clearer.
Going to the main body of the book, the first remarkable ct is the numbering system employed to organize its propositions.
I thrust you shall by now be suspicious enough of this kind of move The second remarkable ct is the very content of the propositions. Those facts, in turn, are said to be represented by propositions, which, consequently, would amount to kinds of pictures of the facts cf.
Notice that the initial footnote, which describes the numbering system, offers no word at all about propositions like n. are comments on proposition no.
m1, n. m2, etc. But if that is true, why would it be necessary to write those propositions in the first place? Perhaps the reason was exactly to show to the reader that those propositions were, possibly against her own expectations, relatively unimportant-yet another attempt to guide our reading in a well defined direction. Now if we try to apply that hypothesis to the case of the 2.
So, even if it is the case, as 2. Now this hypothesis also seems to hold of the 3. And if I am right in thinking that this is yet another self- conscious attempt to guide the readers in a well defined direction-that of putting these propositions aside as unimportant-and, therefore, also an invitation for transgression, another interesting question arises: what if we decide that those propositions should be taken as really important?
Stephen Mulhall, during a seminar on Wittgenstein. My whole attempt to read the Tractatus owes much to the instigating remarks he made on that book during that seminar. Act one: reading the Tractatus 76 i.
Complex propositions are the results of the combinations among truth-functions expressed by elementary ones elementary propositions are truth-functions of themselves-cf. To begin with, it is worth remembering that the Preface raises, but does not exactly answer, two questions which are fundamental to understand how such a task was supposed to be accomplished by the book, viz. Now this is exactly the role of the presentation of a general form of proposition: provided that we have found such a form which, N.
the examples of the pseudo-propositions of mathematics, science, and ethics, dealt with, respectively, in 6. This general reading receives further support when applied to the two penultimate propositions of section 6. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.
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Although it would not be satisfying to the other person-he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy-this method would be the only strictly correct one. Remember that the two propositions above are meant as clarifications of 6. It may take some work to understand how proposition 6.
So let us try to get a little bit clearer about those qualifications before we proceed reading the propositions in the list. Its first textual occurrence is on 6. Trying to sum up the view being presented at this juncture, it seems that we can distinguish at least two claims: ii. i that the fact that the world exists is what is mystical, and ii. Now, two different ways of drawing such limits are presented in that section: one is positive-the unveiling of limit cases of propositions tautologieswhich directly display those very limits in themselves-and another is negative-the unveiling of pseudo-propositions such as those of mathematics, science and ethics which arise from the hopeless attempts to express something necessary about the world, and, to this extent i.
But why in the world is Wittgenstein here going against his own advice of remaining silent about what is beyond such limits? The best I can do right now is to mark it off for later treatment.
Having done that, I suggest we continue with the reading. So let us turn our attention to proposition 6. The answer seems more straightforward in this case: it does so by making explicit an otherwise implicit methodological consequence of 6.
To this extent, 6. Now the exegetical trouble arises when we stop thinking about these circumscribed cases, and start to think about the general procedure followed in the book as a whole-after all, just ask yourself: has Wittgenstein followed his own advice in the preceding sections of the book?
Of course the answer seems to be: not at all; as we saw, he voices metaphysical ontological theses from the very beginning in order to achieve the results indicated in the Preface. This message of self-destruction occurs in the last proposition of section 6, and goes as follows: 6. He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.
He must overcome these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. The challenge remains that we have yet to understand: i how we are were we? supposed to use to have used? those propositions which ones?
Now, before trying to understand how the ladder works-or, better, if we really want to understand this point-I think we should try to sharpen our general reading by applying it to specific problems posed in the book, in between the path through which we have been walking in large steps up to this point.
This is my cue to introduce the problem with which I shall be mainly concerned in the rest of the text-viz. By analysing these propositions, we shall 64 The translation of the last sentence was amended, following a suggestion from Floyd, who in turn owes it to Goldfarb see Floyd,pp. The same goes to the analysis presented in section 6. However, after its introduction in the Preface, it is only in section 5. Before reading the sub-propositions offered to elucidate this one, let us pause and think about how we have arrived at it-i.
Letting the technical details of that analysis aside, this reminder must give us a better sense of how difficult it is, indeed, to understand the role of proposition 5.
It may be of some help to indicate some of the most important stops in this path, as follows: section 1 established that the world is the totality of facts instead of things in logical space; section 2 goes from this brief and very condensed ontology to an examination of the conditions for the representation of those facts which constitutes reality.
When we abstract from the particular medium in which these pictures are conveyed i. Thoughts must be made manifest in some perceptible way 3. In other words, 3. Section 4, in turn, makes more explicit and elaborates the account of how this connection between language and world ultimately obtains. Intermission: from realism to solipsism, and back again 83 Strictly speaking, then, what we have are not two limits at all-the limits of language and the limits of world-but rather two cts, say, of the same limits Notice, though, that this analysis has an important shortcoming, in that it does not explain the appearance of the first personal singular pronoun in its possessive form-i.
But why is that pronoun necessary in the first place? A case can be made for that hypothesis if we think about the conditions for applying the method of projection, which is introduced in 3. Diamond,n. The question arises, however, whether after reading the rest of the book we can still have any confidence in the obtaining of the antecedent of this conditional.
as a projection of a possible situation. can be common to two different symbols-in which case they will signify in different ways. The immediate purpose of the list is to help us see how the idea of a representing subject is at least implied-since it is not explicitly mentioned-by the analysis of the conditions for the method of projection. To put it briefly, the idea is that if we are to have propositions with a determinate sense i.
I refer to proposition 5.
This of course is not the same as explaining what exactly is the meaning of the resulting thesis-a task which requires that we read the sub-propositions of this section.
In order for propositional signs to have sense I have to think the method of projection. What I cannot project is not language. Without the accompaniment of my consciousness language is nothing but a husk.
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Hacker,p. According to him, the whole set of psychological concepts employed in the Tractatus e.
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Thanks to Dr. Stephen Mulhall for calling my attention to that reading, to Paulo Faria for further references. Intermission: from realism to solipsism, and back again 87 But we are moving forward too fast.
So, let us turn back to the main sub-propositions offered to clarify 5. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
The idea presented in the first sentence 5. The second sentence 5. The next sentence 5.
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These considerations shall help us see the point of the otherwise very innocuous final sentence of the section 5. Given the limiting conditions imposed by logic to the expression of thoughts, we are always faced with only two options: either we say something ultimately determinate and contingently true or false about the world, or else we are just babbling, in which case we were better advised to remain silent After these considerations, the role of 5.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language of that language which alone I understand mean the limits of my world.
This time the relation of the proposition above with 5.
As I said above, it should come as no surprise that this problem is brought to view in this context-after all, it presents itself in a very natural way when we start thinking critically about the congruence between the limits of my language and the limits of my world. What, on the other hand, seems very surprising is the content of the next sentence 5. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly. The rather cryptic answer to that question is given in the first part of the next sentence 5.
But this of course is not the whole story told in 5. The remaining half is presented in the last part of 5. So, let us turn our attention to those further qualifications. As to iiiagain some work of interpretation is needed if we are to go beyond the absurd and rather comic idea that we cannot say what we have just said-viz.
Now the analysis of 5.
Before continuing with the analysis of 5. Now, if the analysis presented above is correct, we should conclude, echoing 5. What is paradoxical about this conclusion is that proposition 5. In other words, chances are that we readers have been somewhat tricked, in that we were first made to stick to the appearance of sense of proposition 5.
But the story, as I said, does not end here-we are still left with the fourth and final point made in 6. What the solipsist means-what he tries to say by employing the signs presented in the first part of 6. In the face of these considerations, it seems that we can sum up the whole content of 5.
By the same token, 72 H. Mounce, in his introductory commentary to the Tractatus, reaches a very similar conclusion. He adds the following considerations in order to clarify the content of that claim: [ What I conceive of as the world is given to me in language. This conception is the only one there is. I know this not because I have considered other possibilities and rejected them.
Rather, I know this precisely because it shows itself in there being no other possibilities. For there is no language but language and therefore no conception of the world other than the one language gives. This conception is my conception. My conception of the world, therefore, like my visual field, is without neighbours.
Intermission: from realism to solipsism, and back again 92 this trivializing or deflationary reading must also hold of 5.
How can we or Wittgenstein be sure about that? Therefore, there seems to be an infinite regress latent in this strategy-a regress which can only be stopped if we entirely give up the attempt to explain what the truth in solipsism is. Is it? But then-and this is the third problem-why does Wittgenstein continue to invite us to think or to imagine that we are thinking about it in the rest of the section?
Is it because to really learn to remain silent we need a greater exposition to the effects of trying to go beyond the limits of Mounce,p. Intermission: from realism to solipsism, and back again 93 language?
The next proposition in our list is 5. The microcosm. Taken by itself, this proposition seems again smoothly amenable to the kind of deflationary rendition presented above-so that its whole point could be rephrased if only it could really be expressed in a proposition! as saying that the only world I can live in is the world in which I am, the world which alone my language can represent.
As if the nonsensical and ineffable character of what I just said was not puzzling enough are we already used to this? Let us have a list: 5. If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc. You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
Whatever we see could be other than it is. Intermission: from realism to solipsism, and back again 94 Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is.
There is no a priori order of things. The first remarkable thing about proposition 5. In fact, the contradiction is so striking that it cries for some kind of reinterpretation. Following the method applied in similar cases above, the first step would be to notice that, contrary to the appearances, 5. Having noticed that, I suppose one would like to ask what is the point of presenting that proposition in the first place.
What, then, is made manifest by that pseudo-proposition? To answer that question we shall pay attention to the next sentence, 5.
Notice, though, that this last phrase is just as nonsensical as the former one 5. So its whole point cannot lie in what it says since it says nothingbut rather in what is made manifest by it-i. Basically the same analysis goes for 5. This analysis shall help us to understand how 5. And this conclusion, in turn, would provide a further confirmation-a further elucidation-of 5. The problem for this reading emerges when we try to apply it to the proposition which lies in between the former ones, 5.
The key to solve this apparent problem is to take proposition 5. That the subject cannot be separated from the world does not imply that it cannot be at least distinguished in some way i.
The same point is made in still more clearly Humean fashion in the Notebooks, e. I objectively confront every object. But not the I. There is no empirical soul-substance thinking thoughts, there are only thoughts.
The self of psychology is a manifold, a series of experiences, a bundle of perceptions in perpetual flux. Now the analogy with geometry is presented by Wittgenstein himself, in the second half of the next first-level sub-proposition 5.
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